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Gay and lesbian unions have been treated like an "elephant in
the living room" by our law-making institutions. Everyone knows
that they exist-their children are in schools, their deeds are
recorded in county offices, their domestic partnership certificates
are filed with local clerks, and their battles over custody, visitation
and property distribution are witnessed in the courts-yet, every
state has refused to recognize gay and lesbian unions, and instead
our legislatures and courts skirt around their perimeter. As a result,
our legal system has created a patchwork of rules and rights
applicable to couples of the same-sex and their children that often
vary depending on the county, city, or judicial district in which
they reside, or the institution at which they are employed. This
inconsistent body of law creates instability, uncertainty and chaos,
conditions which are unacceptable in a nation where due process
and liberty are paramount values.
By prohibiting the establishment of a family through the means
most widely recognized in our culture-i.e., marriage, states
effectively prohibit full participation in American society by
lesbians and gay men and their children.1 The family is the most
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important organizing unit of our society. For its mem-
bers-spouses, parents, and children-it provides emotional
support, security, commitment, and a sense of belonging. It cannot
be disputed that sexual orientation is irrelevant to the enjoyment of
these basic human rights. Nothing about sexual preference makes
one more or less desirous, capable, or worthy of those rights. For
society at large, families provide stability, responsibility for others
(especially children), and economic interdependence. The state
interest in a stable society is advanced when families are estab-
lished and remain intact. This is true regardless of the gender of the
spouses.
The exclusion of homosexuals from the marriage franchise has
tangible consequences that detrimentally impact same-sex couples
and their children. These families are denied access to the regime
of rules and rights provided by domestic relations laws, including
the right to equitable distribution and spousal maintenance upon
dissolution of the union, and the right to visitation for the non-
natural parent of the child.2 In addition, certain pension rights and
income tax advantages under federal law are not available to those
who are not "spouses" under the law.3 In New York, for example,
non-legal spouses do not have rights upon the death of their life
by the Committee on Matrimonial Law, 52 THE RECORD 343, 357-64 (Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York ed., 1997) (listing the benefits of
marriage). The United States General Accounting Office compiled a report on
the benefits associated with civil marriage that identified 1049 federal laws in
which benefits, rights and privileges are contingent upon marital status. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. B-275860, LETTER REPORT 1-2 (1997)
(responding to a request by the House in connection with the enactment of the
Defense of Marriage Act).
2 In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 (N.Y. 1991).
3 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (1994) (providing pension benefits to
surviving spouses); I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523 (1996) (providing non-taxable
transfers to spouses). Certainly, there are some benefits to unmarried cohabitators
under federal income tax law. See I.R.C. § 1 (1999) (providing income tax rates
that in some instances penalize married couples); I.R.C. § 32 (1999) (setting out
credits that require married couples to file joint returns); I.R.C. § 151(c)(2)
(1999) (denying deductions for personal exemptions to married dependents);
I.R.C. § 219(g) (1999) (limiting retirement savings deductions for certain married
individuals).
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partners, so that when one's partner dies, the relationship is wiped
out as if it never existed.4
Once gay and lesbian marriages are afforded the same rights
and responsibilities as heterosexual marriages, their unions will be
established, maintained, and dissolved according to a set of rules
developed in accordance with a consistent and thoughtful public
policy. Working, living and having children within a secure and
caring family unit will cease to become a guessing game requiring
a stack of legal documentation and a thick skin. The whole cloth
of marriage will replace the confusing patchwork that exists today.
This Article will make the case for ending the uncertainty and
ad hoc decision-making that has enormous consequences for gay
and lesbian individuals and their children. First, the Article
considers the basis for the existing public policy on marriage and
the realities that militate for change. Next, the Article considers
substantive due process jurisprudence and the right to marry under
the United States and New York State Constitutions, and concludes
that the right to marry for people choosing partners of the same sex
is a logical application of an existing fundamental right. The
Article then considers the Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States and New York State Constitutions and applicable federal and
state case law. It examines the ban on same-sex marriage as a form
of gender discrimination that must be afforded heightened scrutiny
or, in the alternative, as a form of sexual orientation discrimination
that may be given heightened scrutiny. Finally, the Article
examines the "state interests" that have been, or may be, posited to
support a ban on same-sex marriage, and concludes that, even
under rational basis scrutiny, the governmental interests are not
rationally advanced by the prohibition of same-sex marriage.
It is important to be clear that permitting civil same-sex
marriage is not equal to endorsing homosexuality. Rather, it is a
4 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301(2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp.
1999) (denying non-spouses the right, without explicit directives from the
decedent, to make decisions about the burial or disposal of the decedent's
remains); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1, 5-1.1-A (McKinney
Supp. 1999) (denying non-spouses the right to intestate succession or right of
election); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(c)(1) (McKinney 1992) (denying non-spouses the
right to waive the doctor-patient privilege of decedent for litigation purposes).
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recognition of the realities of today's families, and a response to
the need for a coherent and consistent public policy. Approximately
eight to ten million children in America are born into families with
a gay or lesbian parent.5 Acknowledging that these parents have
established a legal relationship for the purpose of granting rights
and developing procedures would not mean that the state is
approving homosexuality, just as laws regulating the dissolution of
marriage do not signify a governmental preference for divorce.
Government must act to fill the void-to recognize that there is an
elephant in the living room and to confront it.
I. PUBLIC POLICY ON MARRIAGE
In a democracy, it is the people who drive public policy, as
public policy ideally reflects the will of the people. Yet, the actions
and reactions of the courts, legislatures, and government agencies
regarding a particular issue, such as same-sex marriage, powerfully
influence how the public will view the issue, assign judgments, and
direct public policy. As a result, this process of formulating public
policy is circular. It creates a situation where social facts that
should contribute to the policy, and are known to the public, but
not necessarily recognized by government, are ignored and are left
out of the circle. Consequently, the policy itself may bear little
relationship to the social facts related to the issue-i.e., the policy
is driven by "myth" rather than by empirical fact. One seeking to
change the policy must "demythologize" more than "disprove" it.
6
The policy of all fifty states to prohibit civil marriage between
people of the same-sex is based on narrow, discriminatory and
unrealistic myths of the family and of gay and lesbian unions.
5 In re Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (citing Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990)).
6 CYNTHIA DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE
POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS 100 (1993).
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A. The Myths
The myths about gays and lesbians and their families are
widespread and rather unflattering. Homosexuals are more severely
stigmatized than any other group in America.7 Homosexuals have
been viewed historically as mentally ill, sexually deviant, or
immoral. They are systematically discriminated against in the
military, immigration, housing, and employment.8 Our government,
through its laws, has in many cases sought to protect historically
unpopular, outcast, or politically powerless groups, such as African-
Americans and women, who are stigmatized and harmed on the
basis of their status as part of a group. Yet, homosexuals continue
to be the victims of de jure discrimination. 9
Outdated attitudes and ideas of homosexuals that cast them as
immoral, deviant, and unworthy are confirmed and perpetuated by
a state when it refuses to treat them equally under the law. Like the
struggle for equal rights for African-Americans and women, the
struggle for equal rights for gay men and lesbians is one that, in
the end, is countered by arguments involving morals, which is
shaky grounding for public policy.
The fact that morals are an inadequate basis for public policy
is evidenced by the fact that government has been seriously misled
by its perceptions of popular morality in the past. For example,
now-disdained government actions that required racial segregation,
outlawed miscegenation, required forced sterilization of "mental
defectives," and prohibited women from working in certain
occupations were justified by a concept of morality that states saw
as held by, and applicable to, all "decent" people. 0
7 Alan Wolfe, The Homosexual Exception, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, § 10
(Magazine), at 46-47.
8 Stacey Lynne Boyle, Note, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting
Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitators, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 126
(1986).
9 J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2360 (1997).
'0 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1-12 (1967) (evaluating a Virginia law
that prohibited miscegenation); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954)
(examining laws of Kansas, Delaware and South Carolina that required racially
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However, traditional concepts of morality have been tempered
by modem realities. In fact, consensual sexual acts between
homosexuals, once widely criminalized, have been decriminalized
in a majority of states either legislatively or through successful
court challenges." Thus, it has become apparent that when
government seeks to dictate private morality (as opposed to
regulate public conduct through laws that prohibit public lewdness,
for example), it inevitably tramples on the constitutional rights of




Nonetheless, the realities of gay and lesbian families are often
obscured by the myths and the traditional concepts of morality.
This moralizing, or attempt to dictate private morality, has ignored
the reality that many lesbians and gay men currently are living with
a partner. 3 As many as eight to ten million children are born into
segregated public schools); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (examining
a Virginia law that required forced sterilization of "mental defectives"-i.e.,
those "probable potential parent[s] of socially inadequate offspring"); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana statute requiring
separate but equal accommodations on trains); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 131 (1872) (evaluating a state's refusal to admit women to the bar).
11 Twenty-five states have repealed anti-sodomy statutes, and five of those
statutes, including New York's, see, e.g., People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 973
(N.Y. 1980), have been declared unconstitutional despite the fact that Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), held that anti-sodomy laws were valid
under the United States Constitution. CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION ch. 10, at 900-01 (6th ed. 1996 & Supp.). Recently, in Georgia,
the state whose statute was upheld in Bowers, the state's anti-sodomy statute was
overturned on the basis of the Georgia Constitution. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d
18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
12 See infra Part IV.D, discussing the constitutionality of government action
regulating private and public morality.
13 Janet Lever, The 1995 Advocate Survey of Sexuality and Relationships:
The Women, ADVOCATE, Aug. 22, 1995, at 27 [hereinafter Lever, Lesbian Sex
Survey]; Janet Lever, The 1994 Advocate Survey of Sexuality and Relationships:
The Men, ADVOCATE, Aug. 23, 1994, at 23 [hereinafter Lever, The 1994
Advocate Survey]. In a survey of nearly 2600 lesbians, 70% said they would
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families with a gay or lesbian parent. 4 Studies show that unmar-
ried cohabitators-homosexual and heterosexual-generally act as
a family unit in their economic, social, and emotional behavior. 5
In recognition of these realities, there has been tremendous progress
around the world and in America in promoting equal rights for gay
men and lesbians generally, and same-sex families in particular.
Specifically, on May 20, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada
took the bold step of striking down provisions of Ontario's Family
Law Act ("FLA") concerning spousal support that excluded same-
sex couples from the definition of those who could receive the
benefit of such support.' 6 The FLA affords a spouse, man or
woman, who cohabits with the other for three or more years the
right to petition for support if the relationship dissolves. 7 Same-
sex couples were not able to seek spousal support when their long-
term, conjugal relationships ended. In M. v. H., a lesbian couple
challenged the FLA under Canada's Charter of Rights and Free-
doms ("Charter"). 8 The Supreme Court of Canada struck down
the support provision of the FLA finding that its exclusion of
individuals involved in same-sex relationships violated the
Charter's requirement of equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination. 9 This holding reflects what is now
the law of the land in Canada: gays and lesbians must be guaran-
teed the same basic rights as other citizens.2 °
Other nations also have made efforts in promoting equal rights
for homosexual couples. In fact, the trend of legal developments in
marry their partner if same-sex marriage were legal. Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey,
supra, at 27. Fifty-nine percent of gay men surveyed said they would marry their
partner; 26% said maybe. Lever, The 1994 Advocate Survey, supra, at 24.
14 In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting) (citing Polikoff, supra note 5, at 461 n.2).
"5 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1128-37 (1981).
16 M. v. H., No. 25838, 1999 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 28, at *134-40 (Can.
May 20, 1999).
"7 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 29 (1990) (Can.).
18 M., 1999 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 28, at *43.
'9 Id. at *133-40. See also Constitution Act, 1982 (79) Part I (§ 15(1), in
force April 17, 1982)).
20 M., 1999 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 28, at *73, 88-89, 93.
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many other countries has been heading toward allowing same-sex
marriages.2 France recently became the largest European nation
to legalize same-sex marriages. Under the law, homosexuals
may register their unions at courthouses and receive most of the
rights allotted to heterosexual married couples.23  Same-sex
marriage, or its legal equivalent, has been recognized by various
other countries. 24 For example, Denmark, Sweden, and the
Netherlands currently permit civil ceremonies that provide same-
sex couples most of the rights associated with marriage. In
Hungary, the legislature has recognized mutually owned purchases
and acquisitions of same-sex couples.26
In the United States, various states and localities are also
making progress toward promoting equal rights for same-sex
couples. Eleven states, including New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Vermont have enacted laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination. 27 Twenty-four states have blocked anti-
gay marriage bills in the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision to apply strict scrutiny to the State's prohibition on same-
sex marriage. 28 In Rhode Island, pro-marriage legislation has been
2' Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to
Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
735, 736-37 (1998).
22 Charles Trueheart, Gay Unions Legalized in France; Unmarried Couples
Win Equal Rights, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 14, 1999, at A14.
23 Id.
24 NAN HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE
BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 78 (3d ed. 1992).
25 id.
26 Wardle, supra note 21, at 737.
27 Lambda Legal Defense Fund and Education, States, Cities and Counties
Which Prohibit Sexual Orientation Discrimination (visited Nov. 16, 1999)
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/antidiscrimi-map>.
28 American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Statewide Anti-Gay
Marriage Laws (last modified Jan. 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/-
gay/gaymar.html>. See infra notes 107-13 (discussing the Hawaii Supreme
Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)). New York is one
of those states that has blocked anti-gay marriage bills. Id. However, as of
January 1998, 25 states and the federal government passed anti-gay marriage
laws to block recognition of out-of-state marriages between individuals of the
same-sex. Id.
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introduced for same-sex couples.29 Moreover, there have been
successful court challenges that have secured the recognition of
constitutional rights for same-sex couples in Alaska 30 and Ha-
waii.3
Domestic partnership registries also have been implemented in
many states and localities, including New York (Albany, Ithaca,
New York City, Rochester), California (Sacramento, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, West Hollywood, Berkeley, Santa Cruz, Laguna
Beach, Long Beach, Palo Alto), and Maryland (Baltimore, Takoma
Park).32 Forty-three municipal and state governments have
29 See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Rhode Island: Marriage
Law (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/issues/-
record?record=39> (noting pro-marriage legislative proposals for same-sex
couples).
30 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-8562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *4-5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (finding that the choice of a
life partner is fundamental and subject to right of privacy protection). But see
S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998) (enacting a constitutional
amendment adding a new section to article I of Alaska's Constitution that states
"[tlo be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one
man and one woman"). Alaska's constitutional amendment was approved by the
State legislature in May of 1998, see House J. 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
1998); Senate J. 4157, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998), and ratified by
Alaskans in November of 1998. See Cheryl Weltzstein, Gays Can't "Marry" 2
States Say, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A16.
31 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59-60 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution is violated when the State's law
denies a marriage license to applicants solely on the ground that they are of the
same sex, unless the State satisfies strict scrutiny and shows that its law furthers
compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn), reconsidered and clarified, in
part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993) (remanding the case to the circuit court to
determine whether there was a compelling state interest for prohibiting same-sex
couples from obtaining marriage licenses). But see Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371,
1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *4-8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (taking judicial notice that
the Hawaii legislature passed an amendment to article I of the Hawaii Constitu-
tion that provides the legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples and recognizing that the State's law denying marriage licenses to same-
sex couples was now "out of the ambit of the [State's] equal protection clause
... [i]n light of the marriage amendment, [which required the court to find that
the law] must be given full force and effect").
32 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, States and Municipalities
Offering Domestic Partner Benefits and Registries (last modified Oct. 25, 1999)
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extended domestic partnership benefits or recognition to their
employees so that same-sex couples and their families are included
within the groups afforded benefits.33
In addition, the Conference of Delegates of the State Bar of
California in 1989 endorsed an amendment to California's law to
permit lesbian and gay couples to marry.34 In 1999, the Civil
Rights Committee of the New York State Bar Association approved
a report supporting legalization of same-sex marriage in New
York.
35
New York, a national leader in protecting individual rights, is
a prime example of a state that has been moving forward in its
recognition of equal rights for gay men and lesbians and their
families. Notwithstanding this progress, it has failed to confront
directly the fact that same-sex unions exist. Nevertheless, the myth
of the "traditional" family, upon which this failure to confront
same-sex unions is based, occasionally has been shattered and
replaced by a realistic legal standard.
For example, the New York State Court of Appeals overturned
the State's anti-sodomy law, with respect to private, consensual
homosexual acts, as a violation of the federal right to privacy.
36
The New York State Court of Appeals and New York's lower
courts have generally acknowledged same-sex unions when doing
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=403>.
The other states and localities with domestic partnership registries include: the
District of Columbia; Washington (King County, Olympia, Seattle, Tumwater);
Wisconsin (Madison, Milwaukee); Georgia (Atlanta); Michigan (Ann Arbor, East
Lansing); Colorado (Boulder, Denver); Massachusetts (Boston, Cambridge,
Provincetown, Springfield); and North Carolina (Chapel Hill). Id.
33 American Civil Liberties Union Freedom Network, Domestic Partner-
ships: List of Cities, States and Counties (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://-
www.aclu.org/issues/gay/dpstate.html>.
34 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 24, at 75-76.
35 See Committee on Civil Rights Minutes of Meeting, at 3 (New York, N.Y.,
Jan. 26, 1999) (approving Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage in New York State: A
Report in Support from the Civil Rights Committee of the New York State Bar
Association with selected revisions by Professor Katz and adopting it as revised
by the Committee by a vote of 9-0) (on file with author).
36 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (N.Y. 1980). The United States
Supreme Court later interpreted the right to privacy more narrowly and upheld
Georgia's anti-sodomy law. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-96 (1986).
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so would further the intent of the legislature in a particular case.37
In fact, New York is one of five states to offer domestic
partnership benefits to state employees. 38 Former Governor Mario
Cuomo and Governor George Pataki have issued Executive Orders
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in state
employment, and to provide benefits to unmarried domestic
partners of state employees. 39  The State has promulgated
regulations to implement housing and adoption laws recognizing
gay and lesbian relationships and, in the case of adoptions, to
prohibit adoption agencies from rejecting adoption petitions solely
37 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (validating second parent
adoption); Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding that a long-term partner in a committed relationship with the decedent
has the right of succession to a rent control apartment); Stewart v. Schwartz
Bros.-Jeffer Mem'l Chapel, 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (permitting
funeral arrangements to be made by life partner of the deceased); In re Camilla,
620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (Fam. Ct. 1994) (permitting biological mother's life
partner to adopt child and become second parent); Zimmerman v. Burton, 434
N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (finding that a life partner has succession
rights to rent control apartment). But see In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (denying visitation rights to a former life partner of
a parent of minor child); In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. Ct. 1990),
aftd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 1993) (prohibiting the life partner of
deceased to inherit under New York's Estate, Powers, and Trusts Law); Storrs
v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal transferred, 674
N.E.2d 335 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837-38 (App. Div.
1997) (upholding Ithaca's denial of a marriage license to a gay couple).
38 The Civil Service Employees Association representing most state
employees reached an agreement with the state to include domestic partnership
benefits in its contract. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 4.28(1), 5.33
(1996). See also Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York State
Law (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/-
record?record=32> (noting that the agreement reached by the Civil Service
Employees Association includes domestic partnership benefits).
19 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 4.28, 5.33. The recognition of
gay and lesbian families of only state employees, and no other employees, on a
statewide basis highlights the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of New York's current
scheme. A proposal is pending in New York City that would require the City to
treat unmarried domestic partners the same as those who are married. Dan Barry,
Giuliani Asks City to Extend Rights to Unmarried Couples, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1998, at Al.
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on the basis of homosexuality of the prospective adoptive
parent(s). 4 In addition, local legislation in Albany, New York
City, and Ithaca have established domestic partnership registries,
and thirteen cities, towns, and counties in New York have enacted
"civil rights ordinances, policies, or proclamations prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination. 41
Even though many states in America and the governments of
foreign nations have made progress in recognizing modern realities
and in establishing laws that protect the rights of gays and lesbians,
the existence of these ad hoc legal standards highlights the flaw in
the nationwide public policy of non-recognition of same-sex
unions. If you happen to work for the state, your life-partner and
children can receive your employer-provided benefits. If not, they
are out of luck. If you are the child of a lesbian couple with the
savvy and wealth to use the courts to maneuver a "second parent"
adoption, you have the right to support and care from both parents.
If not, you lose. Public policies generally should promote stability,
consistency and fairness. With respect to families, public policy
should seek to further family stability and child welfare. Currently,
the system does not work to these ends. This flaw in nationwide
public policy is especially troubling when individual rights
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions are violated as a
result of that policy.
40 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2104.6, 2204.6, 2500.2, 2503.5,
2520.6, 2523.4 (1999) (dealing with succession rights of unmarried life partners);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 421.16(h)(2) (regulating adoption).
41 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York State Law (visited
Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/-
record?record=32> (listing the local laws prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination: Albany County, LOCAL LAW No. 1 (1996); Suffolk County,
SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE, § 89-1, as amended by LOCAL LAW No. 5 (1988);
Tompkins County, LOCAL LAW C (1991); Albany, ORDINANCE No. 97.112.92,
CITY CODE, ch.1, art. XI (1992); Alfred Village, ORDINANCE, art. II, § I (1974);
Brighton, TOWN EMPLOYMENT POLICY; East Hampton, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY POLICY STATEMENT (1985); Ithaca, MUNICIPAL CODE ON HOUSING
& FAIR PRACTICE, chs. 28 & 29 (1994); New York City, ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE, tit. 8 (1993); Rochester, INTRO. 45 (1983); Syracuse, LOCAL LAW No. 17
ON FAIR PRACTICE (1990); Troy, 2-20 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN (1979);
Watertown, RESOLUTION ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT (1988)).
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II. DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE
UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. The United States Constitution
The fundamental right to marry is firmly guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and includes the right to decide whom
to marry." The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he freedom to
42 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383-88 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Asserting that
same-sex couples have the right to marry does not require analysis of whether
there is a fundamental right to homosexual sexual relations-i.e., a gay or lesbian
person is not defined solely by the private, consensual sexual acts he or she
performs. That question has been decided by the United States Supreme Court.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). However, it is important to note
that the Bowers Court clearly distinguished the fundamental right to privacy
implicated in familial contexts from the non-fundamental right to engage in acts
of sodomy. Id. at 190-91. In addition, Justice Powell, the swing vote in the 5-4
decision in Bowers, later called his vote "a mistake." Ruth Marcus, Powell
Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3. Finally, the
New York State Court of Appeals had previously decided the matter differently,
affording such conduct the status of a "fundamental right." People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (N.Y. 1980). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977) (reiterating the Supreme Court's holding
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)); Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (stating that "[w]hile the outer limits
of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear
that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
government interference are personal decisions relating to marriage ... [and]
family relationships") (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973));
Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (stating that "[the Supreme] Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
those liberties protected by the Due Process Clause"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 713 (1976) (stating that "[w]hile there is no 'right of privacy' found in any
specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has recognized that 'zones of
privacy' may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and, thereby,
impose limits upon government power"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (stating that "[t]his Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 43 It has
likewise continuously affirmed that "[c]hoices about marriage,
family life and the upbringing of children are among associational
rights [the Supreme] Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in
our society,' . . . [and they are] rights sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against the State's unwanted usurpation, disregard, or
disrespect." 44 The right to marry and choose one's life partner has
been considered "quintessentially the kind of decision which our
culture recognizes as personal and important., 45
However, at one time, courts questioned whether the right to
marry could be extended so as to prohibit states from outlawing
decisions of individuals regarding whom to marry based upon race.
In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court considered Virginia's
miscegenation law, which had been enacted on the basis that
society viewed interracial marriages as destructive to the moral and
social fabric of the state.46 The Loving Court looked to the United
States Constitution as a source of individual rights for those who
fell in love and wished to marry and create a family with another
human being, and balanced this right against the asserted state
interest.47 The Court found that the right to marry is a fundamen-
tal right which includes the freedom to marry another regardless of
his or her skin color.48 It did not limit that fundamental right to
marry to a list of eligible spouses based upon the perceptions and
prejudices of the community. The Court did not hesitate to include
Further support for the fundamental importance of marriage is found in Supreme
Court decisions dealing with rights of access to courts in civil cases. See, e.g.,
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
41 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
44 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996). See LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-
40 (stating that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
45 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *8 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
46 Loving, 388 U.S. at 3, 7.
41 Id. at 12.
48 id.
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in the definition of that fundamental right its application to
interracial marriages.
Each time new applications of fundamental rights are contested,
courts look to see whether the rights are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" or are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental., 49 These phrases,
sometimes referred to as Palko or Snyder justifications, have
become watchwords of our constitutional faith. They are used
alternatively to uphold or to strike down restrictions on individual
liberty depending upon the composition and collective ideology of
the court and the artfulness of the pleaders in any particular case.
More specifically, whether or not any one liberty interest is
consistent with precedents in the substantive due process line of
cases almost entirely depends on how it is characterized by the
litigants or judges involved. In Washington v. Glucksberg, Justice
Souter explained this concept in his concurring opinion by stating
that:
When identifying and assessing the competing interests of
liberty and authority, for example, the breadth of expres-
sion that a litigant or a judge selects in stating the compet-
ing principles will have much to do with the outcome and
may be dispositive.. . . So the Court in Dred Scott treated
prohibition of slavery in the Territories as nothing less than
a general assault on the concept of property. . . . [T]he
usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the all-
or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification
instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of
old principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect
instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles
afresh by new examples and new counterexamples. The
"tradition is a living thing" Poe [v.Ullman,] 367 U.S. [497]
at 542 [1961] (Harlan, J., dissenting), albeit one that moves
by moderate steps carefully taken.5°
49 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
50 521 U.S. 702, 769-70 (1977) (Souter, J., concurring).
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The Glucksberg Court, in upholding a state ban on physician-
assisted suicide, characterized the liberty interest as "a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so. '5 ' Loathe to create a "new" fundamental right, it determined
that there is no fundamental right thereto. 2 Instead, the Supreme
Court could have chosen, as did the district court,53 to use the
respondent's broader characterization of the liberty interest at
stake-the "basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy" and
"self-sovereignty," recognized as fundamental rights in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health54 and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.
55
Similarly, in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics,56 the Alaska
Superior Court considered the framing of the question essential to
the court's conclusion when it distinguished that portion of
Hawaii's decision in Baehr v. Lewin which refused to categorize
same-sex marriage as a fundamental right.57 Judge Peter Michalski
wrote for the Brause court:
The Hawaii court could reach such a conclusion because
of the question it chose to ask. It is self-evident that same-
sex marriage is not "accepted" or "rooted in the traditions
and collective conscience" of the people. Were this not the
case, Brause and Dugan and the plaintiffs in Baehr would
51 Id. at 736.
52 Id. at 728.
" 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
14 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
15 505 U.S. 833, 857-61 (1992) (recognizing that the concepts of personal
autonomy and liberty recognized by the Court in Roe v. Wade have not been
altered or diminished). In Roe v. Wade, the Court characterized the liberty
interest generally as personal autonomy, declining to consider whether abortion,
the specific matter at hand, was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or
"rooted in our traditions." 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). If it had applied that
narrow characterization, one suspects the result would have been different.
56 No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27,
1998).
57 See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text (discussing Baehr, where
the Hawaii Supreme Court found a right to same-sex marriage protected under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution).
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not have had to file complaints seeking precisely this right.
The relevant question is not whether same-sex marriage is
so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right,
but whether the freedom to choose one's life partner is so
rooted in our traditions.58
The Alaska court went on to hold that such freedoms are "personal,
intimate, and subject to the protection of the right to privacy. 59
B. The New York State Constitution
The United States Constitution is not the only foundation of
law that courts have leaned upon to recognize an individual's right
to marry. State constitutions traditionally have supplemented the
United States Constitution to provide citizens of each state
additional protections above the floor required by the federal
constitution. In fact, the Nation's founding fathers recognized the
primacy of states in protecting individual rights and contemplated
a role for the states as the principal protectors of individual
rights.6 °
Indeed, New York State's constitutional protections supplement
the broad protection of the right to privacy contained in the United
States Constitution. Although the New York State Court of Appeals
has not ruled directly on the constitutionality of the State's
prohibition of same-sex marriage, examination of its interpretations
of the State Constitution's Due Process Clause and its decisions of
first impression dealing with the rights of homosexuals and their
58 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (finding that the prohibition on same-sex
marriage violates right to privacy and equal protection under the Alaska
Constitution) (emphasis added). But see S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess.
(Alaska 1998) (enacting a constitutional amendment adding a new section to
article I of Alaska's Constitution that states "[t]o be valid or recognized in this
State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman").
59 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4. On this basis, it directed that further
hearings be held to determine whether a compelling state interest can found for
Alaska's ban on same-sex marriage. Id. at *6. See also infra Part IV.C & D,
discussing the state interest in barring same-sex marriage.
60 GOTIrFRIED DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND
FREE GOVERNMENT 141-75 (1961) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
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families leads to the conclusion that the New York State Court of
Appeals would invalidate the State's prohibition of same-sex
marriage, just as the courts in Alaska and Hawaii invalidated that
same prohibition in their states.6'
New York's strong tradition of protecting its citizens' liberty is
reflected in its 1683 Charter of Liberties and Privileges, in its
original 1777 Constitution and in the decisions of its highest
court.62 The New York State Court of Appeals did
not hesitate when [it] concluded that the Federal Constitu-
tion[,] as interpreted by the Supreme Court[,] fell short of
adequate protection for our citizens to rely upon the
principle that that document defines the minimum level of
individual rights and leaves the States free to provide
greater rights for its citizens through its Constitution,
statutes or rule-making authority.
63
New York citizens have benefited from a State Constitution in
which "fundamental liberties" are defined more expansively, and
are thus more widely protected, than those liberties are defined in,
61 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (holding that the prohibition of same-sex
marriage is a violation of the right to privacy and equal protection under the
Alaska Constitution); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-68 (Haw. 1993)
(declaring that the denial of marriage licenses to persons who wish to marry a
person of the same gender violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii
Constitution), reconsidered and clarified, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.) (remand-
ing the case to the circuit court to determine whether there was a compelling
state interest for prohibiting same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses).
But see S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998) (enacting a
constitutional amendment adding a new section to article I of Alaska's
Constitution that states "[t]o be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may
exist only between one man and one woman"); Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999
Haw. LEXIS 391, at *4-8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (taking judicial notice that the
Hawaii legislature passed an amendment to article I of the Hawaii Constitution
that provides the legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples and recognizing that the State's law denying marriage licenses to same-
sex couples was now "out of the ambit of the [State's] equal protection clause
... [i]n light of the marriage amendment, [which required the court to find that
the law] must be given full force and effect").
62 See PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (1991).
63 Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1193-94 (N.Y. 1979).
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
and protected by, the United States Constitution. 64 New York
always has been, and remains, in the forefront of defining and
defending fundamental rights.
This has been demonstrated most clearly through the applica-
tion of article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution by
New York courts, which provides protection for due process rights
and which, by interpretation, provides the fundamental liberties to
the people of New York.65 The New York State Court of Appeals
has been credited with "discovering" substantive due process in an
1856 case, Wynehamer v. People.66 Since then, the clause has
been used by the judiciary as a "flexible tool" to provide protection
under an interpretation of right to privacy that goes beyond that
afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
64 See, e.g., People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. 1987) (holding
that the State Constitution imposes more exacting standards for issuance of
search warrants than the Fourth Amendment); People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud
Books, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494-95 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the State Constitution
provides greater protection for freedom of expression than the First Amendment);
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173-75 (N.Y. 1978) (finding
that the statutory provisions concerning foreclosure of garageman's possessory
lien constitute state action and violate the Due Process Clause of the State
Constitution); People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that
the State Constitution imposes due process limitations on police conduct); People
v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896 (N.Y. 1976) (finding that the right to counsel
under the State Constitution is broader than the Sixth Amendment guarantee).
65 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (stating that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law"). While due process protections
were provided by the 1777 Constitution, the clause as it stands now was added
in 1821. GALm, supra note 62, at 47.
66 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). In Wynehamer, the Court struck down a New York
State liquor prohibition law by reading due process to involve more than simply
procedure, but the kind or degree of exertion of legislative power invoked. Id.
at 418.
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States Constitution.67 This tool has been used to expand the
fundamental right to marry for the citizens of New York.68
The New York State Court of Appeals has recognized that the
New York State Constitution has established a fundamental right
to marriage and choice of family life that is expansive and that
provides protections beyond those provided by the United States
Supreme Court when it applies parallel provisions of the United
States Constitution.69 In Cooper v. Morin, the New York State
Court of Appeals rejected the United States Supreme Court's
limited substantive due process formulation when considering the
right of pretrial detainees to "contact visits" in order to maintain
family relationships.7 ° Justice Meyer wrote for the Cooper court
that "[s]o one-sided a concept of due process we regard as
unacceptable."'" The court's expansive formulation resulted in a
holding that invalidated state restrictions on the family that had
previously been upheld by the United States Supreme Court under
the United States Constitution.7 2
Importantly, the New York State Court of Appeals has taken
the position that the New York State constitutional right to privacy
67 GALm, supra note 62, at 49. See Cooper, 399 N.E.2d at 1193-94. See also
Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the New York
State Constitution guarantees the right to privacy and protects involuntarily
committed mental patients from forcible medication). New York's highest court
has interpreted the United States Constitution's privacy protections more broadly
than the United States Supreme Court has when it considered New York's anti-
sodomy statute, signaling New York's willingness to provide protections to its
citizens beyond the minimum level required by the United States Constitution.
People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939-43 (N.Y. 1980).
6 Cooper, 399 N.E.2d at 1195.
69 Id. at 1194-95. However, the Cooper court found that the fundamental
right to marry does not imply that the State cannot regulate or even restrict that
right in every instance. It simply found that any governmental restriction will be
afforded heightened scrutiny by the court-i.e., any restriction must be narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. Therefore, governmental
restrictions on incestual marriages, for example, could be upheld under a public
health and welfare rationale. In re May, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953). See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 209 & n.4 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 399 N.E.2d at 1191-92.
71 Id. at 1194. -
72 Compare id., with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561-63 (1979).
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and due process protects non-traditional, alternative family living
arrangements as well as those arrangements made by conventional,
biological families.73 In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, an
ordinance that restricted housing to "family" members and defined
"family" as those related by blood or marriage was challenged by
a landlord who contended that the "restrictive definition of 'family'
contained in the ordinance is facially invalid under ... the due
process and equal protection clauses of the New York State
Constitution. ' 74 The New York State Court of Appeals held that
the ordinance was facially invalid under the Due Process Clause of
New York State Constitution, finding that the government interest
in preserving the character of traditional, single-family housing may
be met by including non-traditional families as well.75
Similarly, a federal district court in New York has interpreted
the United States Constitution as providing important protections
for non-traditional families. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York expanded the constitutional
definition of "family" under the United States Constitution in a
case with important implications for gay and lesbian couples.76
Recognizing the "diversity of family constellations in our society"
and the extent to which the Constitution already has been interpret-
ed to provide protected liberty interests for members of non-
biological and non-legally related or formalized families, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
" McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 (N.Y. 1985).
Other state courts have taken that same position. See Charter Township of Delta
v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W. 2d 831, 833 (Mich. 1984); City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1980); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 370
(N.J. 1979). See also Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 626 A.2d 372, 381 (Md.
1993) (holding that restrictions on the renting of residential property to unrelated
adults violates the equal protection principles in Maryland's State Declaration of
Rights).
74 488 N.E.2d at 1242.
71 Id. at 1244. Judge Simons wrote for the McMinn court that government
may, through zoning, "control types of housing and living and not the genetic or
intimate internal family relations of human beings ... and if a household is the
functional and factual equivalent of a natural family[,] the ordinance may not
exclude it." Id. at 1243.
76 Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in the stability and
integrity of [the relationship between] . . a foster mother and a
foster child."77 The court based its holding on the "emotional and
psychological ties" and the "deeply loving and interdependent
relationship" between the persons involved and the "mutual care
and support developed in these relationships" as well as their
"expectations of permanency., 78 It used the state interest in
preserving the integrity and stability of families to endow non-
traditional families with constitutional significance. 79 The door is
now open for an interpretation that can protect gay and lesbian
families, so long as the liberty interest is properly defined.
At the same time, the New York State Court of Appeals has
gone out of its way to interpret state statutes so as to recognize the
rights of individuals involved in same-sex relationships and their
families in order to further interests of public policy. For example,
in In re Jacob, New York's highest court interpreted the State's
Domestic Relations Law to permit second parent adoptions so that
the unmarried partner of a child's biological parent could adopt the
child without requiring the termination of the biological parent's
rights upon such adoption.8° In Braschi v. Stahl Associates, the
New York State Court of Appeals interpreted rent control laws to
permit succession rights to unmarried life partners.81
71 Id. at 194. While the issue involved in Rodriguez was adult-child
relationships, rather than adult-adult relationships, the reasoning of the Court is
relevant to both.
78 Id. at 194-95.
'9 Id. at 195.
80 660 N.E.2d 397, 401-05 (N.Y. 1995). In addition, in In re Jacob, the court
sought to rectify the injustice created by its decision in In re Alison D. v.
Virginia M., in which the court interpreted New York's Domestic Relations Law
to prohibit non-parents from seeking visitation rights with children they raised
as part of an unmarried union. Id. at 399-400 (citing In re Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991)).
81 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-55 (N.Y. 1989). However, lower courts in New York
have been inconsistent on the issue of whether marital rights should be extended
to same-sex partners. See, e.g., Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup.
Ct. Tompkins County 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (App.
Div. 1997) (upholding state action denying marriage license to gay couple); In
re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. Ct. 1990), affd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801
(App. Div. 1993) (denying right of election by same-sex partner); Stewart v.
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Although the New York State Court of Appeals has yet to
decide a case challenging New York State's prohibition on same-
sex marriage under substantive due process analysis, one lower
court has done so. In Storrs v. Holcomb, the Tompkins County
Supreme Court upheld the denial of a marriage license to a gay
couple against the claim that such a denial violates the New York
State Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.82
In a decision virtually devoid of state constitutional analysis, the
Storrs court applied In re Cooper, a case involving statutory
interpretation of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law
("EPTL"), and held that no violation of New York State's Equal
Protection Clause had occurred.83 In In re Cooper, the petitioner's
claim did not assert that the right to privacy gave the petitioner the
ability to marry his partner and, thus, the right to the benefits of a
Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1993) (permitting funeral arrangements for deceased by life
partner); In re Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1991)
(permitting second parent adoption).
82 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-88 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1996). In Storrs,
the plaintiff appealed directly to the New York State Court of Appeals, which
transferred the case, sua sponte, to the Appellate Division of the Third
Department. 674 N.E.2d 335 (N.Y. 1996). The Appellate Division dismissed the
claim for failure to join the New York Department of Health as a necessary
party. 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837-38 (App. Div. 1997). On February 18, 1998, the
case was refiled in the Tompkins County Supreme Court. Storrs v. Holcomb, No.
98-0164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Tompkins County filed Feb. 18, 1998). While two lower
courts have considered the validity of same-sex marriages entered into by
mistake and voided for that reason, the issue raised by Storrs-whether New
York State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal or New York
State Constitutions by denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples-has not
been decided. See Francis B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1974) (involving a women seeking an annulment on the grounds that her
husband, whom she thought was a male, was really a female); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1971) (involving
a male who married a person he thought was female).
83 Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88. In re Cooper involved an interpretation
of the term "surviving spouse" under New York's EPTL for the purpose of a
claim to a right of election. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 797-99 (App. Div. 1993). The
Appellate Division in In re Cooper decided that the legislature intended to limit
the term "surviving spouse" so as to exclude homosexual life partners. Id. at 801.
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"surviving spouse" within the definition of the statute.
Therefore, In re Cooper contained no analysis of the issue: whether
New York State violated individual constitutional rights of a person
to marry another person of his or her own choosing. While the
Storrs court recognized this omission and, in fact, admitted the
validity of plaintiff's substantive due process claim, it declined to
make what it called a "very long inferential leap" to decide Storrs
on that basis.85
Yet, the inferential leap referred to in Storrs would be short, if
one were to look at the commitment demonstrated by the New
York State Court of Appeals to an expansive view of substantive
due process and fundamental rights. In particular, the New York
State Court of Appeals has interpreted the fundamental right to
marry embodied in the State Constitution broadly and has
recognized an evolving social order, which includes the existence
of individuals involved in same-sex relationships and their
children.86 This short leap would be one that would restore order
to the chaos that has beset the courts when they have been called
upon to interpret many conflicting legal standards so as to resolve
the issues that arise when gay and lesbian families come together,
live together, and sometimes break apart.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNITED
STATES AND NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONS
New York State's Equal Protection Clause found in article I,
section 11 of the State Constitution was approved at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1938.87 That convention, more than any
other before or since, was committed to "positive liberalism" and
to a "belief that the state had the obligation to promote the welfare
4 In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98.
85 Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
86 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 412-13 (N.Y. 1995); Braschi v. Stahl
Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49, 59 (N.Y. 1989); Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 539
(N.Y. 1987); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (N.Y.
1985); Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1195-96 (N.Y. 1979).
87 2 REV. REcoRD OF N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1065
(1938) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11).
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and protect the rights of as many people as possible. 8 8 The Equal
Protection Clause was designed to "embody in our Constitution the
provisions of the Federal Constitution which are already binding
upon our State and its agencies. 89 Over time, the New York State
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted as more
progressive and as providing more protection from invidious
classifications and discrimination than its federal counterpart.9°
The failure of the states to recognize marriages between
individuals of the same-sex, while recognizing those between men
and women,9' regardless of the respective couples' child-bearing
capacities, child-rearing history, or past conduct in marriage, is
unconstitutional because it constitutes status-based discrimination
that likely cannot stand under the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States or New York State Constitutions. In effect, the states
have found that all homosexuals, as a group, are ineligible to enter
into marriage, which deprives them, as a group, of exercising a
fundamental right-the right to marry.92 No other groups-not
88 GALIE, supra note 62, at 27.
89 2 REV. RECORD OF N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1065
(1938).
90 See, e.g., People v. Kern, 544 N.E.2d 1235, 1244-45 (N.Y. 1990) (finding
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of a particular race violates
the State's Equal Protection Clause even though the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), expressly declined
to decide whether the Federal Equal Protection Clause restricted the exercise of
peremptory challenges by defense counsel as well as by the prosecution).
91 The New York legislature has been silent on the issue. The Department
of Health has interpreted the statute to prohibit same-sex marriage. Section 10
of New York Domestic Relation Law, setting forth the requirements for
marriage, is gender-neutral. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1999)
(stating that "marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be
a civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of making a
contract is essential"). Therefore, New York's marriage law can be applied to
same-sex couples without statutory revision.
92 Essentially, states are utilizing a classification based on sexual orientation
that, by its operation, denies a fundamental right to homosexuals as a group and
that should be subject to strict scrutiny. This requires the state to show that a
compelling state interest for the classification exists and that such a classification
is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
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even convicted criminals 93 or dead-beat parents94-have been
constitutionally denied this basic right.95 This state-imposed group
disability is "incompatible with the constitutional understanding
that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to
equal justice under the law."96
When a state acts, using homosexuals as a legislative classifica-
tion that receives different treatment, its action likely would be
invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause even if the funda-
mental right to marry does not extend to same-sex couples. This is
because a legislative classification that withholds important rights
or privileges--even if non-fundamental-from a class of persons,
while making them available to others similarly situated, violates
the Equal Protection Clause.97 The attributes of marriage as
defined by the United States Supreme Court-i.e., emotional
support and public commitment, religious and spiritual significance,
physical consummation and entitlement to government or other
See also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161, 1168-69 (1988) (discussing the definition of a "fundamental right" in the
due process and equal protection contexts).
93 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating that "the right to marry,
like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of
incarceration... [however, m]any attributes of marriage remain").
94 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (holding that a Wisconsin statute that barred
residents from marrying if they had a child not in their custody that they were
under an obligation to support was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution).
9' Even though denying criminals or dead-beat parents the right to marry
arguably would serve some important state interests, such as financial support for
children, states have not denied criminals or dead-beat parents the right to marry.
See id. at 386.
96 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 & n.14 (1982).
97 For example, the non-fundamental right to public education is relevant to
alien children in the same way that it is relevant to non-alien children and must
be afforded to them. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 230 (holding that a Texas
statute withholding state funds from local school districts for educating children
who were not "legally admitted" violated the Equal Protection Clause, because
it imposed a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of individuals who were not
accountable for their status in the class, which was not rationally related to
furthering some substantial state interest).
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benefits-are as relevant and important to homosexual couples as
they are to heterosexual couples.98 Therefore, equal protection
mandates equal treatment of their unions.
Some have argued that the legally relevant distinction between
heterosexual and homosexual couples is their respective abilities to
procreate. 99 This distinction, however, must be viewed in light of
the fact that an ability or willingness to procreate has never been,
nor can it constitutionally be, a condition of marriage.'00 This
contention is supported by the fact that many heterosexual couples
cannot or choose not to have children, while many homosexual
couples can and do elect to undertake the responsibilities of
parenthood, either though adoption, surrogacy, or artificial
insemination. In fact, New York's policy regarding adoptions
specifically protects the rights of homosexual couples to adopt.' '
Indeed, because the choice and ability to have children are not
limited to heterosexual couples united in marriage, the physical
ability to procreate should not be used as a basis for denying
marriage to non-heterosexual couples. 2
98 Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
9 Courts have traditionally held that marriage implies a willingness to
procreate. See Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. 1926); Miller v.
Miller, 228 N.Y.S. 657, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1928). In addition, avoidance of
procreation was seen as grounds for annulment. See Gerwitz v. Gerwitz, 66
N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
'o See Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 (protecting the rights of inmates to marry
even if they cannot engage in sexual relations with their spouse due to their
confinement); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(upholding a marriage solemnized after the woman's successful sex-reassignment
operation, despite the fact that transsexuals are sterile). See also 1 ALBA CONTE,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND LEGAL RIGHTS § 17.2, at 603 (1998) (stating that
"the ability to bear children is not a prerequisite for male-female marriage");
Edward Veitch, The Essence of Marriage: A Comment on the Homosexual
Challenge, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 41, 42 (1976) (positing that marriage "can be
viewed as no more than an economic partnership which is more plausible
nowadays due to the fact of the working wife").
101 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (1999) (prohibiting
qualified adoption agencies from rejecting adoption petitions solely on the basis
of homosexuality).
112 Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 324 n.20 (D.C. 1995)
(Ferren, J., dissenting).
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A. Gender Discrimination
The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and New
York State Constitutions are implicated when the state uses its
power-the exclusive power to validate marriages-to deny
recognition of same-sex unions and, therefore, to discriminate on
the basis of gender."0 3 The state commits gender discrimination
when it refuses to legitimize a union between a man and a man, or
a woman and a woman, in that "but for" the gender of one party,
the marriage would be recognized.'O° More specifically, just as
the fact that whether state action treats members of each race the
same is irrelevant when a state uses a legislative classification
,03 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (finding that
when the state denies marital status to same-sex couples, it deprives those
couples of extensive rights and benefits solely on the basis of sex), reconsidered
and clarified, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993) (remanding the case to the
circuit court to determine whether there was a compelling state interest for
prohibiting same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses). But see Baehr
v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *4-8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999)
(taking judicial notice that the Hawaii legislature passed an amendment to article
I of the Hawaii Constitution that provides the legislature the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples and recognizing that the State's law denying
marriage licenses to same-sex couples was now "out of the ambit of the [State's]
equal protection clause ... [i]n light of the marriage amendment, [which
required the court to find that the law] must be given full force and effect").
"o See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (explaining that "if twins, one
male and one female, both wished to marry a woman and otherwise met all of
the Code's requirements, only gender prevents the twin sister from marrying
under the present law"). But see S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska
1998) (enacting a constitutional amendment adding a new section to article I of
Alaska's Constitution that states "[t]o be valid or recognized in this State, a
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman").
One may argue that since the restriction on same-sex marriage impacts men
and women equally-i.e., gay men cannot marry nor can lesbian women-then
there is no gender discrimination. However, this argument fails to recognize that
equal protection attaches to the individual, not the group, so that the individual
female who cannot marry because her chosen mate is female is, thus, deprived
of her rights.
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based on race,10 5 the fact that state action treats each gender the
same-i.e., all men and all women have the same opportunity to
marry-also should be irrelevant when the state uses a legislative
classification based on gender. Discrimination on the basis of
gender is subject to "heightened" scrutiny, which requires the state
to show that the challenged classification is "substantially related
to the achievement of an important governmental interest." 10 6 It
was on the basis of gender discrimination that the Hawaii Supreme
Court held in Baehr v. Lewin that the State's prohibition of same-
sex marriage was presumptively invalid under the State Constitu-
tion. 107
105 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (holding that even when all
blacks and all whites are punished the same under a state law if members of
either racial group intermarry, the law is subject to strict scrutiny analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause because the law classifies on the basis of race).
106 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); People v. Santorelli, 600
N.E.2d 232, 234 (N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J., concurring); People v. Liberta, 474
N.E.2d 567, 576 (N.Y. 1984).
107 852 P.2d at 67, reconsidered and clarified, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court to
determine whether there was a compelling state interest for the prohibition. 852
P.2d at 74. The circuit court found no compelling state interest for the
prohibition and struck it down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at * 19-
22 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996). On November 3, 1998, Hawaii voters approved
an amendment to their State Constitution giving the legislature the power to
preserve marriage as a union between opposite sexes. The amendment was
placed on the ballot and succeeded largely due to a strenuous lobbying campaign.
Dan Foley, A Loss That Moves Us Forward, Is in the End a Victory (visited
Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.hrc.org/campgn98/hiloss.html>. See Baehr v. Miike,
No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *4-8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (taking judicial
notice that the Hawaii legislature passed an amendment to article I of the Hawaii
Constitution that provides the legislature the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples and recognizing that the State's law denying marriage
licenses to same-sex couples was now "out of the ambit of the [State's] equal
protection clause ... [iun light of the marriage amendment, [which required the
court to find that the law] must be given full force and effect"). The Superior
Court for the State of Alaska also would have afforded intermediate level
scrutiny to the gender classification at issue in Brause if it had not invalidated
that state's same-sex marriage prohibition on other grounds. Brause, 1998 WL
88743, at *4.
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The reasoning underlying the Hawaii Supreme Court's holding
illustrates that the state-wide public policy denying legitimacy to
same-sex unions is constitutionally unsound. In Baehr v. Lewin,
three same-sex couples brought suit for injunctive and declaratory
relief and sought a declaration that the Hawaii Marriage Law, as
applied by the State's Department of Health to deny licenses to
same-sex couples, was in violation of the Hawaii Constitution's
prohibition of sex discrimination. 1°8 The Hawaii Supreme Court
found in Baehr that denying a legally recognized marriage to same-
sex couples required "strict scrutiny" analysis under the Hawaii
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, which meant that the State
had to show a "compelling state interest" for using gender, an
invidious classification, as a basis for affording different treat-
ment."° Hawaii's main argument was that no sex-based discrimi-
nation had occurred because the generally accepted definition of
the word "marriage" includes only the relationship between a man
and a woman. ° The Baehr court rejected this argument because
108 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
1o Id. at 67. In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny,
rather than intermediate level scrutiny, because it analogized the Hawaii
Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment to the proposed National Equal Rights
Amendment ("ERA"), which would have required that gender classifications be
afforded strict scrutiny according to a majority of the United States Supreme
Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Id. New York does not
have its own ERA, therefore, gender classifications would be given intermediate
level scrutiny. See Craig 429 U.S. at 197-98 (holding that gender classifications
must serve "important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives"); Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d at 234 (Titone, J.,
concurring) (finding that gender classifications have to be substantially related
to the achievement of an important government objective); Liberta, 474 N.E.2d
at 576 (stating that statutes that treat male and females differently violate equal
protection "unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of
an important government objective").
"0 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51. At trial, the state also argued that same-sex
couples were not similarly situated with respect to child rearing, and therefore,
the denial of access to marriage was not a sex-based classification. On appeal,
the Hawaii Circuit Court rejected that argument after hearing from experts called
by the parties. The circuit court found that the scientific data, studies, and
clinical experience presented showed that children of same-sex couples tend to
develop in a normal fashion. Id. at 67-80. In fact, the circuit court found that
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it was analogous to the rationale used for declaring that interracial
marriages were impossible and unnatural, which was rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia."' Indeed,
the Baehr court reasoned that whether the State Constitution
extended to protect same-sex couples who were denied a legally
recognized marriage should be based on an "evolving social order,"
and not the "will" of a deity or a traditional definition of the word
"marriage." '112 This reasoning lead the Hawaii Supreme Court to
hold that denying same-sex couples the right to a legally recog-
nized marriage violated the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause."
3
In New York, unlike in Hawaii, the Tompkins County Supreme
Court, in Storrs v. Holcomb, rejected an Equal Protection challenge
to the State's ban on same-sex marriage. 4 The Storrs court's
holding was based solely on precedent established in In re
children being raised by gay and lesbian couples would benefit from their
parents' marriage, if allowed, because of the protections and benefits that would
become available as a result of marriage. Id.
"' 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
112 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
113 Id. at 67. Nevertheless, there are states where challenges to bars of same-
sex marriage have been unsuccessful. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
590 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). However, these cases were
all decided before the groundbreaking decision in Baehr v. Lewin. Since Baehr
has been decided, there has been a successful challenge to state action prohibiting
same-sex marriage. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI,
1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). But see S.J. Res. 42,
20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998) (enacting a constitutional amendment
adding a new section to article I of Alaska's Constitution that states "[t]o be
valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man
and one woman"); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 336 (D.C. 1995)
(distinguishing Baehr as being premised on Hawaii's Constitution and viewing
the District of Columbia's ban on same-sex marriage as valid under rational basis
scrutiny). In addition, there is a challenge to state action prohibiting same-sex
marriage pending in the Vermont Supreme Court. See Baker v. Vermont, No. 98-
03 (Vt. filed Jan. 15, 1998).
114 645 N.Y.S 2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal transferred, 674 N.E.2d
335 (N.Y. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div. 1997).
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Cooper,"5 which did not consider treating a ban on same-sex
marriage as a gender-based classification under equal protection
analysis. Following the precedent established in In re Cooper,
where the issue of gender classification was not even raised by the
petitioner, the Storrs court applied the lowest level scrutiny,
"rational basis," to the ban on same-sex marriage and found that
the "long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male
and female," justifies the classification." 6 Consequently, a rehear-
ing of Storrs, or a similar challenge to New York's ban, must
consider the argument of gender discrimination that carried the day
for the Baehr court in Hawaii.
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination
The New York State Court of Appeals, the United States
Supreme Court, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have not
decided whether, under equal protection analysis, sexual orientation
is a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which requires laws that classify
persons based on sexual orientation to be subjected to heightened
scrutiny."7 However, in a notable New York case, Able v. United
115 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sur. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App.
Div. 1993).
116 Storrs, 645 N.Y.S 2d at 287.
117 The New York State Court of Appeals specifically refused to decide the
standard of equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation. See Under 21 v. City
of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 1985) (challenging mayoral authority to
prohibit contractors with the City of New York from discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation). The court stated, "[w]e need not decide now whether some
level of 'heightened scrutiny' would be applied to governmental discrimination
based on sexual orientation." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided the proper standard of
equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation and considered Bowers v.
Hardwick on the basis of substantive due process, not equal protection. 478 U.S.
186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law). The Court also failed
to address that question in Romer v. Evans because it held that Colorado's
Constitutional Amendment facially discriminated against homosexuals and,
therefore, could not withstand even the most minimal scrutiny. 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996). See also Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that homosexuals have "traditionally...
been subjected to strict, or at least heightened scrutiny").
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States, the federal district court found that "[h]omosexuals meet the
criteria of a group warranting heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection clause.""' 8 In arriving at this conclusion, the district
court applied the criteria articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in identifying a suspect or quasi-suspect class 9-i.e.,
homosexuals, as a class, have been subjected to historical discrimi-
nation and unequal treatment; members of the class suffer from
unique social stereotypes; the characteristic identifying the class is
immutable; 20 the trait is irrelevant to the group's ability to
perform or contribute to society;' 2' and the group is politically
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has failed to rule on the issue of the
proper equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation. See Able v. United States,
155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Second Circuit was not
required to decide which standard of scrutiny was appropriate under equal
protection analysis); Falk v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941, 947 (2d Cir.
1989) (refusing to comment on the military practice of discharging individuals
on the basis of sexual orientation).
"' 968 F. Supp. 850, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 155
F.3d 628, 632-36 (2d Cir. 1998). In Able, the issue presented to the district court
was whether the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy concerning homosexu-
als in the armed forces, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id. at 851, 865. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes the
same constitutional requirements on the federal government as the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment imposes on the states. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). Nonetheless, on appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Able upheld the military's policy, affording
extraordinary deference to legislative judgment regarding the military. Able, 155
F.3d at 632. The Second Circuit, however, explicitly avoided the question of
whether discrimination on the basis of homosexuality should be afforded
heightened scrutiny. Id. at 632-36.
" Able, 968 F. Supp. at 864.
120 The Able court found evidence that sexual orientation is, for some,
immutable, and for all, it forms a significant part of a person's identity. 968 F.
Supp. at 863. It conceded that the causes of sexual orientation are still in dispute,
but found that the United States Supreme Court has never held that immutability
is required for heightened scrutiny. Id. at 863 (citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 443 n. 10 (1985)). In fact, aliens are accorded heightened
scrutiny, although alienage is not immutable. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971).
12 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding that sex is a
suspect characteristic that bears no relation to one's abilities).
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powerless. 22 Thus, government actions classifying persons based
on sexual orientation and treating homosexuals, as a class,
differently, should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
Similarly, in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City
of Cincinnati, the federal district court held that gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals comprise a quasi-suspect class, which requires both that
any law treating that class differently serve an important govern-
mental interest and that any such law is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.'23 In applying that test, the federal district court
permanently enjoined a voter-enacted city charter amendment that
would have prohibited adoption or enforcement of any protection
based on an individual's sexual orientation-i.e., an individual's
status or conduct in a homosexual relationship. 2 4 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court's
decision and relied on Bowers v. Hardwick to confirm that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class
under equal protection analysis. 125 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
examined the amendment to the City Charter of Cincinnati
prohibiting the enactment of any law affording special class status
based upon sexual orientation under rational-basis scrutiny.12 6
Four other federal courts of appeals also have ruled, primarily by
reference to the Supreme Court's due process decision in Bowers,
122 San Antonio Sch. Indep. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(finding that political powerlessness is among the traditional indicia of
suspectness).
123 860 F. Supp. 417, 440 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
124 Id. at 449. See also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-
28 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (opining that homosexuals
comprise a suspect class). State courts have ruled inconsistently on the issue. See
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 314 (D.C. 1995) (granting summary
judgment dismissing a challenge to the district court's denial of a right to same-
sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
based on the definition of marriage). However, Judge Ferren found that summary
judgment was improper because sexual orientation may be a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification. Id. at 336-37 (Ferren, J., concurring).
125 128 F.3d at 292-93, 301 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-
94 (1986)).
126 Id. at 293, 301.
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that the class of individuals who engage in homosexual sexual acts
do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class for the purpose of
equal protection analysis. 127
Yet, the failure of the federal courts of appeals to recognize
homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class is misleading
because those courts improperly relied on Bowers since it was a
due process case in which the Supreme Court expressly noted that
it was not addressing an equal protection issue. 2 8 Even though
two of the four courts of appeals recognized that Bowers was not
dispositive, they still went on to find that the class was not suspect
based on their notion that homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic. Notably, that notion entirely ignored a substantial
body of scientific research to the contrary.
129
More importantly, reliance on the reasoning in Bowers that
homosexuals possess no fundamental substantive due process right
to engage in homosexual conduct is unpersuasive. 3 ° This is both
because that reasoning has been rejected recently by Georgia,
where the case originated,' 3' and because that reasoning already
had been rejected by New York and several other states even
before Bowers was decided. 3
2
127 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
570-73 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir.
1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
128 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8 (stating that "[r]espondent does not defend
the judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, or the Eighth Amendment.").
129 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1075.
Homosexuality is not a choice or activity-it is an individual characteristic, like
the color of one's skin or eyes, which is immutable. See Boyle, supra note 8, at
127 & n.109 (citing J. MONEY AND A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY &
GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM
CONCEPTION TO MATURrrY 228 (1972)).
130 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94.
13 Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
132 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941-42 (N.Y. 1980). The other states
that had rejected Bowers before it was decided include: Kentucky
(Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Kent. 1990)); Minnesota
(State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn.1987)); New Jersey (State v.
Ciuffini, 395 A.2d 904, 908 (N.J. Super Ct. 1978)); Pennsylvania
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In addition, a finding that homosexuals constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny under equal
protection analysis is supported by the fact that other countries
already have outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 133 In fact, ten foreign nations expressly have forbid-
den discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.13 1
Even if gays and lesbians should not be characterized as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, and the prohibition on same-sex
marriage is to be analyzed under rational basis scrutiny, a court
would be required to examine the classification in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans.135 In that case, the
Court examined an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution
that would have prohibited all governmental action protecting
homosexual persons. 36 This amendment classified individuals on
the basis of sexual orientation and was challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court held
that the amendment was unconstitutional even under rational basis
scrutiny because a status-based enactment creating an adverse
impact on a disfavored class solely for the purpose of disadvan-
taging that class violated the Equal Protection Clause. 137
In applying Romer, a court asked to review a state's prohibition
on same-sex marriage would be required to formulate a legal basis,
other than the "political, cultural, religious and legal consensus"
opposed to homosexuality, on which the Storrs court relied, 38 in
order to uphold the ban. Romer stands for the principle that equal
protection means "neutrality where the rights of persons are at
(Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 1980)); and Texas (Morales
v. State, 826 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)).
133 See Wardle, supra note 21, at 737-38.
114 Wardle, supra note 21, at 737-38 (citing KEN THOMASSEN ET AL., ILGA
EUROLET-'ER 45, at 15-18 (Int'l Lesbian & Gay Ass'n ed., 1996) (noting that
Canada, Spain, Slovenia, Finland, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, France and Norway prohibit discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion)).
135 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
136 Id. at 624.
"37 Id. at 633-34.
138 Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1996).
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stake" and that one group, gays and lesbians, cannot be precluded
from exercising a right because of the animosity of others.'39
Quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, advised: "the Constitution
'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' . . . Unheeded
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the
law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake."'
140
IV. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN PROHIBITING SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE
Both substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence
require courts to determine and then weigh the "state interest" upon
which a law is enacted, regardless of whether the standard of
scrutiny is "strict," "heightened" or "rational basis." The state
interests in denying homosexuals the right to marry referred to in
cases and scholarly writings reveal that those interests are a pretext
for a misguided or, frankly, unconstitutional public policy with the
sole purpose of disadvantaging homosexuals as a group. 4 1 The
reality is that, in some instances, the state interest identified to
justify the ban on same-sex marriage would be served by legal
recognition of same-sex marriage.
A. Upholding Tradition
In Storrs v. Holcomb, the New York supreme court relied on
the "long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male
and female" as testimony to a political, cultural, religious and legal
consensus contrary to the recognition of same-sex unions. 142 In
In re Cooper, the appellate division found that the "historic institu-
tion" of marriage as a union between a man and a woman is "more
139 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36.
140 Id. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)).
141 Id. at 634.
142 Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
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deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept of
marriage" and even looked to the book of Genesis for support.'4 3
Yet, these lower courts ignore the evolution of the law in which
most traditional gender-based legal differences in marriage law
have been eliminated, either legislatively or judicially, regardless
of custom and tradition.' 44 With the legal content-rights and
responsibilities-of marriage now being gender-neutral, it has been
persuasively argued that the legal form of marriages as a union of
opposite genders is obsolete. 145 One lower court in New York has
questioned "whether, in this era of domestic partnerships and
alternative lifestyle education in grammar school, it can still be said
that marriage has one ... meaning which does not include couples
of the same-sex."'
146
143 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act under the United States Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause as denying the right to marry). See also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (stating that marriage "is and always has been
a contract between a man and a woman").
144 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 455 (1981) (invalidating
a state statute giving a husband the right to unilaterally dispose of property
jointly held with wife); Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1979) (striking down
an Alabama law providing that husbands and not wives are liable to pay post-
divorce alimony as violating United States Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (invalidating a
provision of the Federal Social Security Act that denied payment of death
benefits to surviving husband in case of the wife's demise).
145 The definition of marriage, as a union between opposite genders, has
been used to preclude same-sex marriage by some courts, concluding that
something that never before existed cannot now be recognized as marriage.
However, scholarly studies on the subject provide historical evidence of same-sex
marriage. See 1 CONTE, supra note 100, § 17.2, at 603 (citing JOHN BOSWELL,
SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE 53-107, 218-61 (1995); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1435-84
(1993)).
146 In re Petri, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 29 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Apr. 4, 1994)
(holding that a surviving gay partner could not inherit without a will or marriage
license).
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B. Fostering Procreation and Childraising
Historically, procreation has been intertwined with marriage and
the state interest in its promotion has been seen as compelling.
147
If procreation and childraising are integral parts of married life
then, it is argued, the state interest in those activities precludes
recognition of same-sex marriage. 148 Interestingly, the relationship
between procreation and marriage has been used on both sides of
the balance, as creating a fundamental right that generally cannot
be limited 149 and as creating a compelling state interest for
limiting a fundamental right. 5 °
However, the physical ability to procreate has never been a
requirement for marriage.' 1 Not every heterosexual marriage
involves procreation and a commitment to procreate is not, nor
could it be, a prerequisite to issuance of a marriage license.' In
141 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. 1926) (stating that procreation is
"the foundation upon which must rest the perpetuation of society and civiliza-
tion").
148 This is not the same as asserting that procreation and childrearing are
important parts of marriage. The distinction is one of degree, i.e., whether one
can marry without the ability or intention to procreate. It is hard to believe that
rational policy makers or courts actually could evaluate the integrity or legitima-
cy of a union based upon the couple's procreative ability.
149 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that "marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
"0 See, e.g., In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (App. Div. 1993) (stating
that society's interest in marriage for procreation "is more deeply founded than
the asserted contemporary concept of marriage"). Moreover, in Baehr v. Lewin,
the State of Hawaii argued that because procreation was the purpose of marriage,
same-sex couples were precluded from marrying. 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993).
The Baehr Court, however, rejected that argument. Id.
151 Veitch, supra note 100, at 42. See also M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (upholding marriage to a transsexual despite the
fact that he was sterile).
15 In regulating marriage, the state can impose "reasonable regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marriage relationship
... [but only so far as they effectuate] sufficiently important state interests."
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1978).
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Turner v. Safley, for example, the United States Supreme Court
held that the fundamental right to marry is retained by inmates in
prison even though they have no present ability to procreate.'53
Traditional reasons for denying the legitimacy of same-sex
unions on the basis of procreative ability are obsolete. It is
questionable whether the state interest in encouraging procreation
still exists. Even if it does, the interest is not furthered by limiting
the institution of marriage to heterosexuals. Current concerns about
overpopulation, limited resources, and environmental degradation
diminish the interest in encouraging procreation. In fact, in
response to these concerns, many heterosexual couples choose not
to have children.154 At the same time, for many reasons, not the
least of which is the advance in technology, more homosexual
couples are having and raising children. Thus, the gender of one or
both partners of a couple has become irrelevant to the goal of
promoting procreation.
C. Promoting Family and Social Stability
Clearly, there is a compelling state interest in a stable society,
the foundation of which is the family unit. The promotion of
marriage itself has been considered a compelling state interest by
the United States Supreme Court. 15 5 The argument advanced is
that the recognition of same-sex marriage would undermine the
family and, as a consequence, undermine social stability.
"' 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987). The Supreme Court held that such unions may
be subject to reasonable regulation to further legitimate penological concerns. It
is on the basis of penological concerns that the Court distinguished Turner from
Butler v. Wilson, which was a case involving a prohibition on marriage for
inmates sentenced to life imprisonment because the denial of the right was part
of the punishment for the crime. Id. at 95 (citing Butler, 415 U.S. 953, 954
(1974)).
114 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, No. 445,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIvING ARRANGEMENTS (1990).
115 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). See also Note, The
Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 578 (1973) (stressing the
special constitutional protection afforded to the fundamental relationship of
marriage).
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First, it must be emphasized that the state's interest in promot-
ing marriage is premised on its legitimate goals in promoting
individual happiness and encouraging economic interdependence
and responsibility for others, specifically children and spouses. It
is decidedly not in the state's interest to protect or advance some
stereotypical vision of the model family.
Second, there is no evidence supporting the contention that
recognition of same-sex marriage will destroy the family and
impact social stability because this contention is based on stereo-
types and fear, which is not an appropriate foundation for sound
public policy. There have been no indications that Denmark,
Sweden, and the Netherlands have experienced any notable
decrease in social stability as a result of the fact that those
countries have recognized a legal equivalent of same-sex mar-
riage. 15 6 The New York State Court of Appeals has recognized
that a prohibition on same-sex marriage does not protect or
advance heterosexuality.'57 In fact, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York has held that the
recognition of non-traditional families serves the state interest in
promoting family stability and integrity.15 8 Similarly, the recogni-
tion of same-sex unions would promote family and social stability
by eliminating the patchwork of familial rights and responsibilities
and replacing it with sound, predictable, consistent, and reasonable
regulations that already are afforded to heterosexual spouses and
their children. In addition, even if deterring homosexuality was a
legitimate state interest, there is no evidence that prohibiting same-
sex unions deters homosexuality, or that recognizing same-sex
unions encourages homosexuality. A governmental goal of
deterring homosexuality is illegitimate and, even if it were proper,
it is unattainable by, and bears no relation to, a state ban on same-
sex marriage.
156 See Wardle, supra note 21, at 736-37 (noting that Denmark, Sweden, and
the Netherlands have recognized formal registration of same-sex "domestic
partnerships," or a legal equivalent of same-sex marriage, for the past 10 years).
'57 People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980). See also Boyle, supra
note 8, at 132-33 (noting that heterosexual unions do not necessarily advance the
state interest in procreation).
158 Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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D. Deterring Homosexual Lifestyles and Preserving Public
Morals
The argument that upholding public morality is the proper basis
for state action is subject to continuous debate. Proponents of that
argument point to dicta in Bowers v. Hardwick to support their
claim that morality is a legitimate state interest in upholding anti-
sodomy laws under rational basis scrutiny.'59 Specifically, the
argument advanced is that the state interest in refusing to foster
same-sex relationships is legitimate if there is a "societal consen-
sus" opposed to homosexuality. 61
However, subjective responses-e.g., discomfort, prejudice or
fear-which some heterosexuals have to the idea of homosexuality,
do not constitute a legitimate justification for discrimination against
gay men and lesbians, according to the United States Supreme
Court's most recent ruling on gay rights.' 6' In substantive due
process jurisprudence, there is a clear distinction between public
and private morality. 62 The New York State Court of Appeals
made this distinction perfectly clear in People v. Onofre when it
struck down New York State's anti-sodomy statute and stated:
Any purported justification for the consensual sodomy
statute in terms of upholding public morality is belied by
the position reflected in the Eisenstadt [v. Baird] decision
in which the Court carefully distinguished between public
dissemination of what might have been considered inimical
to public morality and individual recourse to the same
material out of the public arena and in the sanctum of the
private home. There is a distinction between public and
'.. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). The Supreme Court did
not require a compelling state interest to uphold Georgia's anti-sodomy law
because it found that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right under the
United States Constitution's 14th Amendment. Id. at 191-92.
'6o Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County
1996).
161 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (finding that the proposed
amendment actually imposed a disability on homosexuals).
162 Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42.
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private morality and the private morality of an individual
is not synonymous with nor necessarily will have effect on
what is known as public morality .... So here, the People
have failed to demonstrate how government interference
... will do anything other than restrict individual conduct
and impose a concept of private morality chosen by the
State. "63
While upholding public morality may sometimes be a legiti-
mate, and even substantial, state interest, private morality is not the
proper realm for governmental regulation. Public disapproval of
homosexuality, a private matter, is not sufficient to outweigh the
fundamental right to marry, nor is it sufficient to justify a class-
based discrimination against same-sex marriage.' 64
In New York, the morality argument against gay marriage is
particularly weak. There is no strong public policy against
homosexuality.1 65 State regulations prohibit qualified adoption
agencies from discriminating against homosexuals as adoptive
parents. 166 Executive orders, regulations, and numerous city and
local ordinances prohibit discrimination against homosexuals and
provide for registration of same-sex unions and benefits to part-
ners. 167 The New York State Court of Appeals has bent over
163 Id. at 941.
'64 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), a paradigm marriage
validation statute designed to promote stability, predictability, and uniformity
among the states, reflects society's strong preference for validating marriages.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 207 (amended 1973). The UMDA only
prohibits polygamous and incestual marriages, and where marriage is not
specifically prohibited it would validate the union. Id.
165 New York's anti-sodomy law does not constitute sufficient evidence of
a public policy against homosexuality since that law was invalidated by the New
York State Court of Appeals. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 942. Although Bowers v.
Hardwick found the United States Supreme Court disagreeing with the New York
State Court of Appeals on the validity of anti-sodomy laws under the 14th
Amendment, sodomy laws have been repealed or declared unconstitutional in a
majority of the states. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text (listing
cases holding anti-sodomy statutes unconstitutional).
166 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (1999) (stating that
"[a]pplicants shall not be rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality").
167 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 4.28, 4.28.1 (1995); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 5.23, 5.33 (1996) (Executive Orders
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backward to accommodate homosexual unions despite the lack of
legislation recognizing those unions.
68
CONCLUSION
Marriage is a favored institution, and this union is given
preferential treatment under the laws of the Nation and New York
State. Marriage is seen as essential to a stable society. Its emotion-
al, social, legal and financial benefits are equally important to both
homosexual and heterosexual couples. The basic human right to
emotional support, security and the other intangible aspects of
being part of a family are vested in everyone regardless of their
sexual orientation. In this regard, the only rational distinction
between homosexuals and heterosexuals is that, while some
heterosexuals may choose not to marry, homosexuals are, as a
class, denied that option.
The right to select a spouse based upon one's own preference
despite societal norms or condemnation is a fundamental right.
Although society may have disapproved of interracial marriages, as
reflected by the actions of the Virginia State Legislature prior to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Loving
v.Virginia,169 the right to choose one's partner in marriage cannot
prohibiting discrimination in state employment on the basis of sexual orientation
and providing for benefits); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 2104.6,
2204.6, 2500.2, 2503.5, 2520.6, 2523.5 (1999) (rent and eviction regulations
recognizing succession rights of unmarried cohabitants). Domestic Partnership
Registries are in place in New York City, Albany and Ithaca. American Civil
Liberties Union, States and Cities Offering Domestic Partnerships Registries
(visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay.dpstate.html>. Anti-
discrimination ordinances exist in Albany, Alfred, Brighton, Buffalo, East
Hampton, Ithaca, New York City, Plattsburgh, Rochester, Suffolk County,
Syracuse, Tompkins County, Troy, and Watertown. Id.
168 In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing second
parent adoptions by same-sex parents); Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d
49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing succession rights in rent control apartments
before regulations legislatively recognizing those rights were promulgated).
169 388 U.S. 1 (1967). At the time, the law in 16 other states disapproved of
interracial marriages. Id. at 7 n.5. The purported state interest was to prevent "the
corruption of blood, ... a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the obliteration of
racial pride." Id. at 7.
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be subject to governmental interference. 70 For instance, even
though society disapproves of parents who fail to support their
children, it cannot prohibit individuals who do so from
marrying. 171 Similarly, the right to same-sex marriage should
need no separate Palko or Snyder justification because marriage is
a privacy right involving decision-making, choice, and
autonomy-just as the rights affirmed in Loving,172 Griswold,173
and Roe174 as well as in a host of cases decided by the New York
State Court of Appeals, did not need separate justification. "The
right to privacy, in constitutional terms, involves freedom of
choice, the broad, general right to make decisions concerning
oneself and to conduct oneself in accordance with those decisions
free of governmental restraint or interference."' 175
The governmental classification of homosexuals who, as a
group, may not marry, clearly discriminates on the basis of
membership in a group, which is contrary to our history of equality
and individualism reflected in the Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States and New York State Constitutions. Whether the
classification is one that is afforded heightened or rational basis
scrutiny still must be determined by the courts, as no precedent
currently gives clear guidance. Yet, whatever scrutiny the courts
afford, the state interest proffered to justify the ban on same-sex
marriage must be carefully examined to see whether it justifies the
170 See, e.g., id. at 12 (holding that a statute restricting a person's right to
choose a marriage partner based on the race of both partners violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
171 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (declaring a
Wisconsin statute prohibiting marriage of individuals in arrears of child support
invalid). It is impossible for one to imagine that a court could rule that there is
some right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty protecting, specifically,
dead-beat parents' right to marry, yet the Court found that denying dead-beat
parents the right to marry was unconstitutional. Id.
172 388 U.S. at 12 (affirming the right of interracial marriage).
173 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 499 (1965) (affirming the
right of privacy in the marital relationship).
174 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (affirming that the right of
privacy includes the right to an abortion).
171 In re Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 539 (N.Y. 1987).
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ban, or is merely pretextual, and actually justifies recognition of
same-sex unions.
